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The two sides of Islamophobia and the perception of threat from Islamic terrorists 
 
ABSTRACT: There is a heightened interest concerning the understanding of prejudice toward 
Muslims in Europe, steadily increasing since 2001. This study aimed at investigating whether the 
phenomenon of Islamophobia could have two different manifestations (i.e., Islamoprejudice and 
Secular Critique of Islam). In particular, we assessed whether two social attitudes, Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA, i.e., Authoritarian Aggression and Conservatism) and Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO), could predicted differently the two dimensions. Moreover, we wanted to 
investigate the different influence of the two dimensions in relation to the perceived threat from 
terrorism. A sample of 366 Italian adults participated in the study completing a self-report 
questionnaire. Data were analysed by means of a structural equation model. Results showed that 
RWA and SDO were differently related to Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam, 
suggesting that certain forms of critique of Islam should not be associated with individual prejudice, 
because are motivated  by secular, democratic and universalistic convictions, denoting the traces of 
cultural biases. However, the  apparently less problematic dimension of Islamophobia, i.e. Secular 
Critique, does not preserve people from perceiving threat from terrorism, in the same way as 
Islamoprejudice. Implications are discussed. 
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The two sides of Islamophobia and the perception of threat from Islamic terrorists 
 
Introduction 
The perception of Islam and Islamic terrorism is a very critical topic in Western societies since 2001 
terrorist attacks. Hostility towards immigrants from Muslim countries has increased in the last 
years, as well as the perception of threat from fundamentalist terrorism, which can lead to a loss of 
well-being and security (Helbling, 2010; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin & Gil-Rivas, 2002). 
Islamophobia is a complex phenomenon influenced by historical, political, and social factors, which 
comprises a prejudiced view of Islam and Muslims, i.e., Islamoprejudice, and a critique of Islamic 
religion motivated by democratic, and universalistic beliefs, i.e., Secular Critique of Islam (Imhoff 
& Recker, 2012). In the European culture the fear of the Muslims is very old and can be traced back 
to the contraposition between the Christian European reigns and the Arabs caliphates first and the 
Ottoman empire later. Recently, in several geopolitical crises between Occidental and Middle East 
countries (e.g., the USA embassy hostages affair in Iran in 1979, the first Gulf war in 1991) both 
sides used religious differences as a mean of propaganda. Moreover, in the last decades Europe and 
North America received great inflows of immigrants from Islamic countries linking the prejudice 
against Muslims with xenophobia and ethnic prejudice. These macro level factors influence the 
diffusion of prejudice against Islam and Muslims, a phenomenon that can not be reduced to a matter 
of problematic individual beliefs. This hostility towards all that deals with Islam and Muslims 
seems to be related to a “cultural racism”, which is a result of colonial frameworks that legitimizes 
the Western world supremacy over Oriental cultures, considered as inferior (Grosfoguel & 
Mielants, 2006). However, people differentiate themselves to the extent of sharing of these 
ideologies constructed over the years by Western culture and society. Two of the most common 
ideological beliefs affecting the relations among social groups are Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Social dominance orientation is defined as “a 
general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers 
such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p.742). 
Instead, right-wing authoritarianism reflects the willingness to submit to legitimate authorities, 
observe traditional norms, and support the hostile and punitive treatment towards people who do not 
comply with them (Altemeyer, 2006).  
Recently, several authors have debated about the nature of values and sentiments that are expressed 
in anti-Muslim attitudes, and are often confused under the overarching label of Islamophobia 
(Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012; Van der Noll, Saroglou, Latour, & Dolezal, 
2018). Indeed, scholars found that prejudiced views of Islam were empirically distinguished from a 
pattern of thought that did not seem to be contaminated with prejudices but was highly critical of 
certain practices commanded by Islam, motivated by secular and liberal values (Elchardus & 
Spruyt, 2014; Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012).  
The aim of the present study was to extend past research on Islamophobia, to verify whether this 
phenomenon could really have different manifestations. Unlike previous work (Heyder & 
Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012), the present study did not only investigate the social 
ideologies (RWA and SDO) that predicted differently the two dimensions, but also aimed to 
assessed the different influence of the two dimensions in relation to the perceived threat from 
terrorism, whose effects may include a loss of well-being and security (Castellini, Colombo, 
Maffeis, & Montali, 2011). Moreover, we tested the mediational role of Islamophobia in explaining 
the relation between social ideologies and perceived threat. Finally, we considered the perception of 
threat both at a personal and at the societal level.  
A better understanding of the complex phenomenon of Islamophobia could be helpful in reducing 
it; particularly, finding the existence of these two different attitudes towards Muslims and Islam is 
important to intervene in different ways, in order to try to change them.  
 
 
Islamophobia: the two facets of prejudice toward Islam  
Anti-Muslim hostility is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1980s, Muslims migrated in large 
numbers from different countries arriving in Europe mainly as asylum seekers: in this period the 
term “Islamophobia” was coined, a sign of growing interest in prejudice and hostility targeted 
specifically toward Islam and Muslims (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Islamophobia can be defined as 
a negative attitude or feeling directed at Islamic religion or Muslim individuals originated in the 
fear of Islam (Bleich, 2011). After the terrorist attacks in Western Europe and in the United States 
since September 11, 2001, negative attitudes toward Muslim communities in Western countries 
have worryingly risen and several researchers have warned about a dramatic rise of Islamophobia 
(Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Sheridan, 2006). According to the Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia (1997), the main dimensions of Islamophobia refer to the perception of Islamic world 
as a uniform formation, different to Western world and subordinate. Moreover, Islam is viewed as a 
manipulative political ideology, criticism of the West made by Islam is a priori rejected, 
discriminatory behaviours against Muslims are considered legitimate, and prejudice and hostility 
toward Muslims are conceived as normal. Individual, social and cultural aspects play a role in 
influencing attitudes toward Muslims. In the particular case of anti-Muslim prejudice, a number of 
negative stereotypes has appeared in media and in the public discourse. Social scientists recognise 
that people create psychological images of the “Other”, in order to preserve their identity (Malek, & 
Wiegand, 1995). Today, modern technology has facilitated the spreading of information on other 
cultures, generally perceived as inferior to Western tradition. Following the definition of Malek and 
Wiegand (1995), the West encompasses “those nations with the capacity to dominate the world 
through economic, military, and ideological superiority” (p. 201). Western media have a great 
power in promoting Western ideals and worldviews, influencing the dominant value positions (Lau, 
Seedat, & McRitchie, 2011). Islamic culture is generally portrayed negatively and as inferior, and 
Muslims are associated with stereotypes of terrorism and violence. Edward Said (1978) early 
described this process, defined as Orientalism, as a kind of intellectual power that European nations 
held on Orient, which primarily encompasses the Islamic world, during the period of colonization 
(from 1815 to 1914). Said (1978) talks about a relationship of power and domination between 
Occident and Orient, relationship of power that Europeans tried to maintain, perpetuating Western 
superiority over the values and behaviours of Orientals (Lau et al., 2011). After September 11, 2001 
those Orientalist views have been intensified, and transformed into a neo-Orientalism towards Islam 
and the Muslim world (Kerboua, 2016). This neo-Orientalism is the reconstruction of Islamic world 
as a social and personal threat to the Western world and civilisation: contemporary Muslims is not 
only portrayed as inferior but mainly as violent and threatening. The social phenomenon of 
Islamophobia can be considered the most hostile manifestation of neo-Orientalism (Kerboua, 2016).  
In the psychological literature, a number of researchers (Stolz, 2005; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008) 
have considered anti-Muslim prejudice as an expression of a general form of xenophobia, i.e the 
fear and distrust of that is perceived to be foreign (Bolaffi, 2003), directed toward this specific 
group. From this perspective, Islamophobia does not seem to be a new social process, but it only 
represents a more generalized feeling of prejudice toward immigrants (Helbling, 2010). However, 
other scholars (Imhoff & Recker, 2012) have felt the need for differentiating a prejudiced and 
closed view of Islam and Muslims, i.e., Islamoprejudice, from critique of Islamic religion motivated 
by democratic, and universalistic beliefs, i.e., Secular Critique of Islam. According to several 
authors (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014; Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012), scholars 
have often combined these characteristics regarding attitudes about Islam, but actually they 
represent two distinct aspects. Indeed, anti-Muslim sentiment can not be exclusively reduced to 
xenophobia, as it comprises the conception of Islam as incompatible with liberal democratic values 
for its religious practices and dogma. Westerner people can perceive Muslims as belonging to a 
culture that promotes extreme submission to religion, a religion that has authority over worldly 
manners and contradicts liberal values such as individualism and autonomy: it might therefore be 
that people for whom these values are very important see their societies in danger due to 
immigration from Muslim countries (Helbling, 2010). This criticism of Islam is different from a 
prejudicial view. Islamoprejudice consists of cognitive negative stereotypes of Muslims, the 
expression of negative affect toward them, and the readiness or intention for discriminatory 
behaviours toward the members of Islamic group. Instead, the Secular Critique of Islam can be 
described as a cognitive belief about critical aspects with respect to rules, norms and practices 
within the collective community of Islamic people (Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016). This cognitive 
belief seems to be a form of bias, because it associates Islam with anti-liberal values, considered as 
negative and inferior to Western democratic values, obscuring the fact that even some Western 
religious communities have anti-liberal values.  In this perspective, Islamoprejudice and the Secular 
Critique of Islam may represent respectively the individual bias against Muslims and the 
endorsement of cultural representations about Islam, which may combine into Islamophobia. 
 
Prejudice and ideological beliefs: the role of RWA and SDO 
In literature, different ideological beliefs were found to be related with prejudice: in particular, 
scholars have pointed out that Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and Social 
Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) are two of the strongest predictors of generalized 
prejudice (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010). Some authors (Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland, 1998; 
Pratto et al., 1994) have considered them as individual and personality variables, but later scholars 
have highlighted that both variables do not pertain to personality traits, but rather express social 
attitudes and beliefs of ideological nature (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Saucier, 2000). These beliefs 
may be the ideological frameworks justifying prejudices towards minority groups and outgroups. 
RWA is a construct derived from the early work on the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) and even if is drawn from a very old theory, recent research 
have found that this theory is still relevant in explaining a social attitude related to prejudice toward 
various outgroups (Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Crawford, Brandt, Inbar, & Mallinas, 
2016). RWA consists of three components: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and 
conventionalism. Authoritarian submission pertains to the desire to submit to authority; 
authoritarian aggression is the experience of feelings of aggression towards people who break the 
rules and do not submit to authority and conventionalism is the adherence to traditions, values and 
rules (Adorno et al., 1950). In more recent years, Duckitt & Fisher (2003) have combined 
authoritarian submission and conventionalism to re-identified them as conservatism, which is 
adhesion to conventional rules, values, institutions and authorities. Although conservatism and 
authoritarianism proper, which comprises the authoritarian aggression component, can be 
empirically distinguished, most literature has considered RWA as a single broad dimension (Duriez 
& Van Hiel, 2002; Helbling, 2012). Scholars have shown that global RWA can predict prejudice 
toward various outgroups, perceived to be threatening to social order (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009). People high on authoritarianism tend to feel hostility and endorse authoritarian 
aggression toward groups seen as menacing collective values, especially when this hostility is 
accepted by the authorities (Altemeyer, 1996; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). RWA was found to 
predict prejudice against homosexual people (Crawford et al., 2016; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 
2010), Muslim individuals (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández Guede, 2007; Heyder & Eisentraut, 
2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012), and immigrant groups (Asbrock et al., 2012; Zakrisson, 2005).  
Social dominance orientation describes a general preference for hierarchies versus egalitarian 
relations between social groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Thus, SDO is the social attitude to consider 
some social groups as superior, with the will of maintaining inequality between groups. People with 
high levels of SDO need to legitimize and preserve hierarchies in social world, thus they devalue 
and experience prejudiced attitudes toward groups that are seen as inferior in status (Duckitt, 2006). 
Research has demonstrated that SDO strongly predicts prejudice: people with higher levels of SDO 
consider social world as a competitive jungle and are more prone to express both blatant and 
explicit prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., Asbrock, Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Duriez & 
Van Hiel, 2002; Passini & Morselli, 2016).  
Thus, scholars have found that both RWA and SDO are ideological dimensions able to predict 
generalized prejudice (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Whitley, 1999). However, 
since people who show negative attitudes toward a specific group may not inevitably be prejudiced 
toward other groups, recent research (Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt, 2006) has suggested different 
patterns of relationships between these social variables and prejudice. Prejudice against groups seen 
as a threat for society, but not socially inferior, could be predicted by RWA, but not by SDO. 
Prejudice toward outgroups that are perceived as low in status, but not socially threatening, could be 
predicted by SDO, but not by RWA. Finally, outgroups seen both as deviant and subordinate could 
be predicted by RWA and SDO jointly (Asbrock et al., 2010). In line with this conception, research 
about Islamophobia found a positive relation between Islamoprejudice and both RWA and SDO: 
people seem to have prejudiced attitudes toward Muslims because they consider this social group 
both socially threatening and inferior (Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012). In 
contrast, Imhoff and Recker (2012) found a negative relation between Secular Critique of Islam and 
RWA: authoritarian people feel the duty to obey authority, whereas people who make a secular 
critique of Islam are opposed to the obligation of Muslims to follow religious norms firmly. 
 
Perceived threat from Islamic terrorism 
Prejudiced attitudes are strongly connected to the perception of threat. The effects of perceived 
threat from Islamic terrorism may include a loss of well-being and security, affecting people’s 
lifestyles and behaviours (Castellini et al., 2011; Torabi & Seo, 2004). Significant evidence 
supports the claim that perceived threat from terrorism vary along a range of individual indicators, 
such as sex, level of education, political affiliation. Women are consistently shown to see greater 
risk and display greater levels of anxiety regarding threat from terrorism (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, 
& Lahav, 2005; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). People with lower levels of education 
are also more likely to express greater perceived threat (Huddy et al., 2005), whereas lower risk 
perceptions are found among politically conservative people, who feel greater control over their 
surroundings (Slovic, 2000). It has also been suggested that authoritarianism predict different 
perceived threats (Stephan & Renfro, 2002), as people with authoritarian attitudes are more prone to 
see the world as a menacing place (Altemeyer, 1988; Eigenberger, 1988). To our knowledge, only 
one study (Crowson, 2009) has investigated the relationship between both the ideological beliefs 
explaining prejudice, i.e., RWA and SDO, and the perception of terrorist threat. Crowson (2009) 
found that RWA was a strong predictor of perceived threat from terrorists whereas SDO completely 
failed to predict it. Furthermore, recent research found that RWA influenced perceived threat, 
because people with higher levels of RWA are more sensitive to any source of threat (Cohrs & 
Ibler, 2009; Kauff, Asbrock, Issmer, Thörner, & Wagner, 2015). Conversely, people with high 
levels of SDO see the world as a competitive place, but not as dangerous, although they have been 
found to feel endangered by outgroups that were seen as direct competitors and with conflicting 
goals (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). 
Some types of people are therefore more prone than others to perceive threats from outgroups, but 
also negative attitudes and related cognitions play a role in increasing the perceived threat (Stephan 
& Stephan, 2017). The classical prejudice approach (Bobo & Hutchins, 1996; Duckitt, 1992) has 
already emphasised that individuals who hold aversive attitudes and negative stereotypes toward a 
certain group are more likely to regard outgroup members as a threat. Indeed, recent research 
(Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010) have found that negative feelings or beliefs about a disliked 
social group could predict different kinds of threats, suggesting that prejudice could lead individuals 
to perceive other groups as threatening. Moreover, a negative and stereotyped view of outgroup 
members, seen as violent, dishonest and inferior, has been found as an antecedent of several types 
of menace (Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson et al., 2002; Velasco González, 
Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). However, to our knowledge, no study has assessed whether 
Islamoprejudice could increase the perception of threat from Islamic terrorism. In previous work 
(Imhoff & Recker, 2012), people high in Islamoprejudice were found to implicitly associate 
Muslims with threat, thus it might be that people with a prejudiced attitude toward Islam are more 
prone to associate the figure of the Muslim with that of the threatening terrorist. 
 
The present study 
The present study aimed at demonstrating the empirical distinctness between a prejudiced view of 
Islam and Muslims (i.e. Islamoprejudice) and a criticism of Islamic religion motivated by secular 
and democratic values (i.e. Secular Critique of Islam), two different aspects often confused under 
the label of Islamophobia. We explored the relations between two ideological belief dimensions (i.e. 
RWA and SDO), the two dimensions of Islamophobia, and the perception of a threat from Islamic 
terrorism. Since that previous work (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) has suggested that RWA can be 
distinguished into two dimensions, we decided to investigate the possibility of empirically 
separating the two aspects of authoritarian aggression and conservatism, in order to observe whether 
they might differentially affect Islamophobia and the perceived threat from Islamic terrorism. 
Moreover, since that terrorist threat can take several forms, we differentiated the experience of 
danger as an individual from the concern for one’s country, also in a more symbolic way. Finally, 
we investigated whether a prejudiced attitude toward Islam and Muslims, i.e. Islamoprejudice, 
could play a mediational role in explaining the relation between the ideological beliefs dimensions 
(RWA and SDO) and the perceived threat from Islamic terrorism. Indeed, we expected that people 
with high levels of RWA and SDO would have negative attitudes and cognitions toward Islamic 
world for different reasons (Imhoff & Recker, 2012), and in turn, this prejudiced view would make 
them more prone to perceive outgroup members as a threat (Pereira et al., 2010). Specifically, 
following the above literature review, we hypothesised as follows:  
1. Right wing authoritarianism would be positively associated with Islamoprejudice and 
negatively with Secular Critique of Islam (Asbrock et al., 2010;Heyder & Eisentraut, 
2016 ; Imhoff & Recker, 2012). 
2. Right wing authoritarianism would be positively associated with the perception of 
terrorist threat (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Kauff et al., 2015). 
3. Social dominance orientation would be positively associated with Islamoprejudice 
(Asbrock et al., 2010;Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016 ; Imhoff & Recker, 2012). 
4. Islamoprejudice would be positively associated with the perception of terrorist threat 





We recruited participants in Torino, a large city in the North of Italy, and its Province via a 
convenience sampling method. Even if this technique does not consist of a random sampling, we 
tried to reach a large range of people, considering their socio-demographic characteristics, such as 
age, gender, educational level, and occupational status. People participated voluntarily to the study 
and anonymity was guaranteed. All procedures performed in this study involving human 
participants were approved by the Italian Society of Community Psychology (SIPCO) and were in 
accordance with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical 
standards. The sample included 366 adults (42.9% males, 57.1% females; average age = 39.86 
years, SD = 17.09). For what concerns the educational level, 19.3% of the participants were college 
graduates, 60.6% were high school graduates, and 20.1% had an educational level lower than high 
school. Of the respondents, 44.2% had never been married, 44.5% were married, 8.5% were 
divorced, and 2.8% were widowed. Concerning occupational status, 66.6% were working, 16.0% 
were student, 7.5% were retired, 5.2% were unemployed, and 4.7% were housewives. Finally, of 
the participants, 33.8% lived in a city with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 22.1% in a city with a 
population of 30,000–100,000 inhabitants, 19.6% in a city with a population of 10,000–30,000 
inhabitants and 24.6% in a small town with less than 10,000 inhabitants. 
 
Measures 
Data were collected through a self-reported questionnaire. We used in the analyses the following 
indicators: 
1. The Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, short version (Manganelli Rattazzi, Bobbio, & 
Canova, 2007) composed by 14 items rated on a 7-point likert-type scale ranging from-3 
(totally disagree) to +3 (totally agree).The scale is made of two subscale measuring 
Authoritarian aggression, composed by 7 items (e.g., ‘Our country desperately needs a mighty 
leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are 
ruining us’) (α=.83), and Conservatism, composed by 7 items too (e.g., ‘A lot of our rules 
regarding sexual behavior are just customs which are not necessarily any better or holier than 
those which other people follow’) (α=.74). 
2. The Social Dominance Orientation Italian scale (Di Stefano & Roccato, 2005) including 7 
items (e.g., ‘To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups’) (α = .78). 
Items were rated on a 5 point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). 
3. The Scale for Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam (SIPSCI) (Imhoff & Recker, 2012) 
composed by 15 items rated on a 7-point likert-type scale ranging from from1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The scale is made of two subscale measuring Islamoprejudice, 
composed by 9 items (e.g., ‘Islam is an archaic religion, unable to adjust to the present’) 
(α=.80), and Secular Critique of Islam, composed by 6 items (e.g., ‘The strict division of 
church and state is a Western accomplishment that would be a progress in many Islamic shaped 
countries’) (α=.68). 
4. Two items investigating the perception of a terrorist threat. One asked “Do you think the 
Islamic terrorism threaten your country?” and the other “Do you think the Islamic terrorist 
threaten you and your family?”. Items were rated on a 5-point likert-type scale which ranged 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). 
5. A brief list of sociodemographic items. 
 
Data analyses 
First, we conducted preliminary descriptive and correlational analyses among our study’s variables. 
Then, we tested the hypothesized relations via structural equation modelling using the bootstrap 




Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the scales and the correlations between them. Concerning 
RWA, participants scored higher on authoritarian aggression than on conservatism. They had higher 
scores of Secular Critique of Islam and lower scores of Islamoprejudice. All the scales correlated 
positively with the others except for the Secular Critique of Islam. This subscale did not correlate 
with authoritarian aggression and correlated negatively with conservatism and SDO. Concerning the 
perception of a terrorist threat, the estimated threat for the country was higher than the estimated 
threat for the individual and his/her family. The two perceptions correlated positively with all the 




We examined a structural equations model, assuming the following relations between variables: (1) 
Right wing authoritarianism would increase Islamoprejudice and reduce Secular Critique of Islam; 
(2) Right wing authoritarianism would increase the perception of terrorist threat for the country and 
for the individual; (3) SDO would increase Islamoprejudice; (4) Islamoprejudice would increase the 
perception of terrorist threat for the country and for the individual. We used a partial disaggregation 
approach randomly aggregating the items of the scales into two indicators for each scale. This 
aggregation decreased the number of variables in the model that could have produced a significant 
reduction of the fit, though it still allowed for an estimation of the measurement error of the latent 
variables. As usually suggested, we tested the model fit using different indexes to reduce the impact 
of their limits (Hu & Bentler, 1998). The model was satisfactory indicating a good fit between the 
model and the observed data: χ2(38) = 91.48, p<.01; χ2/gdl = 2.41; CFI = .97; TLI = .95; RMSEA = 
.062. Figure 1 shows the model in graphic form. Authoritarian aggression increased 
Islamoprejudice (β=.42), and the perception of terrorist threat for the country (β=.33) and the 
individual (β=.32). Conservatism decreased Secular Critique of Islam (β=-.43). SDO increased 
Islamoprejudice (β=.23). Islamoprejudice increased the perception of terrorist threat for the country 
(β=.24). Secular Critique of Islam increased the perception of terrorist threat for the country 
(β=.21). The paths linking Authoritarian aggression to Secular Critique of Islam, Conservatism to 
Islamoprejudice and the perception of terrorist threats and the paths linking both dimensions of 
Islamophobia to the perception of terrorist threat for the individual were not significant. Bootstraps 
showed the indirect effect of Authoritarian aggression on the perception of terrorist threat for the 
country (β = .12; 95% CI = .06 to .21; p <.02; S.E. = .05) and of SDO on the perception of terrorist 
threat for the country (β = .06; 95% CI = .02 to .13; p <.01; S.E. = .03).The model explained the 
46% of the variance of Islamoprejudice, the 15% of that of Secular Critique of Islam, the 33% of 
that of the perception of terrorist threat for the country, and 20% of that of the perception of terrorist 
threat for the individual. 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we investigated the relations among two ideological belief dimensions, i.e. RWA and 
SDO, Islamophobia and the perceived threat from Islamic terrorism. For what concerns the 
relationship between RWA and Islamophobia, we found results consistent with previous work 
(Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012), that has ascertained a positive correlation 
between this social attitude and Islamoprejudice, but a negative one with the Secular Critique of 
Islam. However, in this previous study, RWA was considered as a single broad dimension. Instead, 
we chose to distinguish two dimensions of authoritarianism, i.e., authoritarian aggression and 
conservatism. We found an interesting result, which seems to suggest the possibility of empirically 
separating these two aspects, when considering RWA: in fact, only authoritarian aggression was 
positively associated with Islamoprejudice, whereas only conservatism was negatively related to the 
Secular Critique of Islam. Authoritarian aggression implies the support for punitive and repressive 
social control of deviance and dissidence (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003): this social attitude may justify 
the hostile prejudice against Muslims, because they are viewed as threatening to collective security. 
Instead, people with a conservative attitude do not seem to have prejudiced attitudes toward 
Muslims: although conservatism involves the idea of an abstract and symbolic social control, some 
scholars (Feldman, 2003) have pointed out the little evidence of the fact that conservatism leads the 
desire for social conformity to converge into prejudice.  
People high in conservatism do not seem to have a prejudiced and closed view of Islam and 
Muslims, on the contrary they are more likely to not condemn Islamic norms. Subjects who endorse 
a secular critique of Islam are against the obligation of Muslims to strictly follow the Islamic norms, 
whereas authoritarian people show obedience to authority (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). In particular, it 
is precisely the dimension of conservatism to be related to respect for and conformity to traditional 
and conventional social values, institutions and authorities (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). Thus, people 
high in conservatism are more likely to not criticise Islamic values probably because they could 
better understand Muslims’ observance for their religious laws. 
The two dimensions of RWA seem then to represent two different aspects of a common ideology 
having different relations with Islamophobia. Authoritarian aggression justifies the hostility towards 
all the deviant groups considered threatening the whole society (and Muslims may be considered a 
deviant group). Conservatism promotes the respect of traditional values in general and then may 
foster a positive attitude toward the Islamic traditionalism too. In line with previous work (Heyder 
& Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012), we found that people with a social dominance 
orientation show prejudicial attitudes toward Islam and Muslims: since people with high levels of 
SDO assume that one’s own group is superior and have negative attitudes toward outgroups seen as 
socially inferior (Asbrock et al., 2010), our results seem to suggest that Islamic group is not only 
perceived as socially threatening, but also as subordinate. 
Western institutions and governments created negative knowledge about the Orient, in order to 
strengthen the European domination on the “Other” and the Westerner power and hegemony 
(Kerboua, 2016). The historical context represents Islam and Muslim world as threatening and 
inferior, continually reconstituting Islamophobic hearts and minds. This cultural construction, often 
passing through the media and modern technology, probably facilitates the assumption of social 
attitudes like SDO and RWA (in its dimension of authoritarian aggression), which in turn influences 
the prejudicial attitudes toward this group. These social attitudes do not influence the Secular 
Critique of Islam. People with conservative attitudes seem to show solidarity with the collective 
community of Islamic people, so the cognitive belief about critical aspects with respect to Islamic 
norms and practices is maintained by people with more liberal and democratic values. Identifying 
the different variables that affect the two aspects of Islamophobia is important to understand at what 
level is necessary to intervene to reduce both phenomena. Indeed, even if the Secular Critique of 
Islam seem to be a less problematic phenomenon, since that it is not characterized by explicit 
cognitive negative stereotypes, negative affect, and the intention for discriminatory behaviours 
toward Muslims, this dimension of Islamophobia keeps track of the beliefs socioculturally 
constructed over the years on the inadequacy of the practices and norms of the “Other”, compared 
to the Western ones considered as the right way to behave. 
For what concerns the perception of a threat from Islamic terrorism, our result is in line with 
previous research on terrorist threat (Crowson, 2009), which found that people with high levels of 
RWA strongly perceive threat from terrorism, whereas people high in SDO do not. However, we 
expanded these results differentiating RWA into two dimensions. We found that only authoritarian 
aggressive people perceive threat for the country and for the individual, whereas having strong 
conservative values  was unrelated to the measures of perceived threat. It has yet been suggested 
that RWA has an influence on the perceived threat, due to an increase in sensitivity for threatening 
issues in the individuals having this social attitudes (Kauff et al., 2015). Probably, it is mainly the 
aspect of authoritarian aggression that is linked to the perception of the world as a threatening place, 
where must be established order and security, repressing dangerous groups. 
Moreover, our findings reveal that people with prejudicial attitudes toward Islamic world perceive a 
greater threat from terrorism, but only for the country: perhaps, a negative view of Islamic group 
leads people to associate Muslims with terrorists, considered as a threat for society. However, 
negative affects and cognitions do not lead people to perceive a personal risk to become a victim of 
terrorism.   
We found also a positive relation between Secular Critique of Islam and perceived threat. Such 
result was unexpected, as people who make this secular critique are not considered as prejudicial 
toward Muslims and  do not consider Muslims to be dangerous (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). This 
result seems to be in contrast with previous research (Imhoff & Recker, 2012), which considered 
the Secular Critique of Islam as a less problematic phenomenon than Islamoprejudice. Indeed, even 
if Islamoprejudice seems to represent a more individual bias towards Muslims and the Secular 
Critique of Islam the endorsement of cultural biased representations about Islam, both the 
dimensions are related to the identification of Islam and Muslims with a danger for our society. 
People who make a secular critique report more rationalized and socially accepted considerations to 
justify the Islamic threat, such as certain Islamic practices and religious dogma about worldly 
issues, that are seen as a menace because can undermine values, belief system, morality or 
worldview of Western societies. However, their ideas seems to denote the traces of cultural racism, 
associated with the neo-Orientalism, that has reconstructed the Islamic world as a social threat to 
the Western world and civilisation (Kerboua, 2016). 
Therefore, Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam seem to differentiate with regard to the 
social attitudes that predict them, but not for what concern their influence on the perception of 
terrorist threat. As mentioned before, the aspect of only condemning Islamic norms and practices, 
without having toward Islamic group a prejudicial attitude, can not be defined as a non-problematic 
phenomenon, in fact it does not preserve people from perceiving threat from terrorism, in the same 
way as Islamoprejudice. Moreover, the present study aimed at assessing whether RWA and SDO 
could be related to the perceived threat from Islamic terrorism through the indirect effect of 
prejudice toward Islam. For what concerns RWA, we found a relation between the dimension of 
authoritarian aggression and the perception of terrorist threat for the country only partially mediated 
by Islamoprejudice. People with high levels of authoritarian aggression have negative feelings and 
beliefs about Islamic group and this attitude, in turn, is positively associated with a greater 
perception of a social threat from Islamic group members, associated with terrorism. However, for 
highly authoritarian people, perceived terrorist threat is probably also expression of a more general 
sensitivity for every potentially threatening situation, posed not only to social security, but also to 
the personal one. In fact, authoritarian aggression is also related to the terrorist threat for the 
individual, but this aspect is not mediated by prejudice toward Islam. About SDO, we found that 
Islamoprejudice totally mediate the relation between this social variable and the perception of 
terrorist threat for the country. Unlike authoritarian people (Kauff et al., 2015), individuals with 
high levels of SDO have not generally an increased sensitivity for threatening issues. However, 
their negative attitudes and cognitions about Islamic world could have influenced their perceived 
social threat from terrorism, perhaps facilitating the association of Muslim individuals with that of 
terrorists.  
A better understanding of factors that can affect the perceived threat from terrorism is important in 
order to try to reconsider it. Perceived threat can lead to negative outcomes (Tartaglia, Conte, 
Rollero, & De Piccoli, 2018). Indeed, the effects of both real and perceived terrorism include 
adverse health consequences in the community, such as a loss of well-being and security, which 
could led to avoidant behaviours and psychological distress (Castellini et al., 2011; Eisenman, Glik, 
Ong, Zhou, Tseng, Long et al., 2009). Our social context tends to overestimate the threat posed on 
the West. In particular, mass media focus on current terror attacks, often employing dramatic 
elements, such as mentioning emotions, dramatizing the speech, showing the victims and counter-
terrorism operations (Eyssel, Geschke & Frindte, 2015). This can cause physiological arousal and 
trigger negative emotions, such as fear (Winterhoff-Spurk, 2004). The results of our study suggest 
that Islamophobia could make people more vulnerable to believe in the representation of 
threatening Islam given by the social context, increasing the perception of threat. Intervention 
should focus on changing some social attitudes, in order to reduce level of distress of people.   
The present study has some limitations. The research is based on correlational data, which weaken 
the evidence in support of the direction of the relationships among ideological belief variables, 
prejudice and perceived threat. Indeed, some have argued that perceived threat can cause prejudice 
toward outgroups (Knowles, Lowery, Hogan & Chow, 2009; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan & 
Martin, 2005) and can influence a social attitude  like RWA, because under conditions of threat, 
people show increases in authoritarian behaviours and attitudes (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; 
Stenner, 2005). The correlational design of our research makes it hard to reach a conclusion about 
the causality of these effects. Further studies should try to replicate the findings, using other types 
of methods. In addition, the two items measuring perceived threat were very broad and the 
participants might have interpreted in different ways, assessing thus different types of threat. Future 
research should use scales which measure specific kinds of threat: specifically, more realistic 
threats, which refer to the physical and economic well-being of the group and the individuals, 
should be distinguished from more symbolic threats, which concern values and beliefs.  
 
Conclusion 
Our study contributes to the literature on Islamophobia, providing further knowledge on this 
phenomenon that seems to have different manifestations. Consistent with previous studies (Heyder 
& Eisentraut, 2016; Imhoff & Recker, 2012), our results suggested that certain forms of critique of 
Islam should not be automatically associated with explicit prejudice, because some criticisms of 
Islamic religion are motivated by secular, democratic and universalistic convictions. However, the 
apparently less problematic dimension of Islamophobia, i.e. Secular Critique, does not preserve 
people from perceiving threat from terrorism, in the same way as Islamoprejudice. We may argue 
that the effects and the manifestations of racism against Muslims are the result of the interplay 
between individual, social, and cultural dimensions. Indeed, individuals may have inclinations to be 
unbiased, but they can nevertheless be agents of racism or Islamoprejudice to the extent that their 
secular critique draws upon cultural representations, associated with Orientalism and societal 
racism, that disproportionately associate Islam with anti-liberal values.   
Our study has also provided a new view on the relationship between social attitudes and perceived 
threat from Islamic terrorism. In fact, even if RWA and SDO predispose people to having 
prejudiced attitudes toward Muslims for different reasons, the resulting negative view of Islamic 
world seems to have a role in increasing the perception of a social threat from Islamic terrorism, 
perhaps due to the association between Muslims and terrorists. Finally, our study has shown the 
different predictive value of two dimensions of RWA, authoritarian aggression and conservatism. 
We found that they differentially related to Islamophobia and the perception of a threat from 
Islamic terrorism, supporting the finding that they can be empirically distinguished (Duckitt & 
Fisher, 2003). In particular, authoritarian aggression seems to characterize a more emotional aspect 
of RWA, related to the individuals, their fears and the way to defeat them; on the contrary, 
conservatism seems to represent the more ideological dimension of RWA, expressing more a value 
promoted by social institutions.    
Taken together, the present findings may suggest some helpful applied consequences. The challenge 
of coping with anti-Muslim attitudes is particularly cogent in contemporary Western societies and 
understanding the key variables and processes related to prejudice is critical in decreasing it. 
Campaigns and interventions aimed at reducing ethnic prejudice may consider the multiple 
dimensions that compose Islamophobia, with the awareness of having to do with two different 
phenomena to be contrasted. Indeed, even if previous studies (Imhoff & Recker, 2012) have 
considered the Secular Critique of Islam as a non-prejudicial attitude, this dimension keeps track of 
the beliefs socioculturally constructed over the years on the inadequacy of the practices and norms 
of the “Other”, compared to the Western ones considered as the right way to behave. Therefore, it is 
not enough to intervene on the personal attitudes of people, but the discourse is wider, including the 
consideration that should be changed the cultural structures that continually reconstitute 
Islamophobic affects and cognitions. 
 Moreover, the issue of threat from Islam represents a critical topic in Western governments’ 
agenda. The EU’s response to such menace involves different aspects – internal and external, 
legislative and operational, repressive and preventive – and, among them, the socio-psychological 
processes may not be neglected (Monar, 2007). This study can contribute to better address such 
processes and their roots.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistic and correlations among variables. 
 Mean SD   Person’s r   
   1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. SDO 
RWA 
2.13 .77       
2. Authoritarian 
aggression 
-.40 1.42 .47**      


















5.57 .98 -.12* -.07 -.31** .16**   
 
6. Terrorist 


















threat for the 
individual 
2.48 1.11 .23** .38** .25** .35** .04 .57** 
** p<.01; * p<.05 
Figure 1. The structural equation model: Standardized regression weights and variances. 
 
Errors and correlations were omitted from the figure in order to make it easier to view. 
Correlations: SDO and Authoritarian aggression r=.57; SDO and Conservatism r=.61; Authoritarian 
aggression and Conservatism r=.48; Islamoprejudice and Secular critique of Islam r=.51; Terrorist 
threat for country and for individual r=.45. 
 
